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Supply chain auditors provide companies with strategic information about the practices of 
suppliers, yet little is known of what influences auditors’ ability to identify and report dangerous, 
illegal, and unethical behavior at factories. Drawing on insights from the literatures on street-level 
bureaucracy and on regulatory and audit design, we theorize and investigate the factors that shape 
the practices of private supply chain auditors. We find evidence that their reporting practices are 
shaped by an array of social factors, including an auditor’s experience, gender, and professional 
training; ongoing relationships between auditors and audited factories; and gender diversity on 
audit teams. By providing the first comprehensive and systematic findings on supply chain 
auditing practices, our study suggests strategies for designing more credible monitoring regimes. 
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Multinational companies (MNCs) are increasingly being held accountable for the social 
and environmental practices in their supply chains by consumers, investors, activists, and 
governments. Companies that seek to market to socially conscious consumers or attract socially 
responsible investors must demonstrate that their products are ethically and sustainably 
produced. Companies seeking to insulate their valuable brands from “name and shame” 
campaigns (Bansal, 2005) have acceded to activists’ demands that they monitor and attempt to 
improve practices in their supply chains (Berrone et al., 2013). Companies must increasingly 
comply with domestic laws requiring due diligence and/or disclosure of supply chain practices 
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(Zandvliet, 2011).
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Suppliers’ social practices thus offer both opportunities and risks to their multinational 
buyers. The benefits of socially responsible production can be substantial. In 2008, Fair Trade 
certified products accounted for nearly $5 billion in worldwide sales. A growing number of 
institutional investors rely on environment and social governance (ESG) metrics to make 
investment decisions (US SIF, 2012). Conversely, multinational buyers are often held 
accountable by NGOs, trade associations, and the press for suppliers’ poor social performance 
(e.g., Galland, 2010; Duhigg and Barboza, 2012; AFL-CIO, 2013). After the Rana Plaza in 
Bangladesh collapsed in 2013, killing 1,100 factory workers, four global retailers who sourced 
from suppliers in the building agreed to contribute nearly $40 million to compensate the families 
(Greenhouse, 2013).  
To exploit these opportunities and manage these risks, many companies have adopted 
private voluntary standards to govern production practices in their global supply chains. These 
include meta-standards for environmental management (ISO 14001) and socially responsible 
management (ISO 28000); technical production standards promulgated by certification and 
labeling regimes such as the Forest Stewardship Council; and contractually imposed corporate 
supplier codes of conduct. To provide reliable assessment of suppliers’ practices and compliance, 
even in regimes where governments cannot be relied upon for effective regulation, companies 
typically employ independent third-party auditors (Montiel, Husted, and Christmann, 2012).  
Information from these audits informs the MNCs’ strategic decisions about supply chain 
partners. Adequate adherence to standards is often a prerequisite for doing business, and high-
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profile MNCs anxious to protect their brand reputations often require their current and potential 
suppliers to comply with labor standards embodied in the MNC’s code of conduct (O’Rourke, 
2003). When auditors fail to accurately assess supplier compliance, they undermine buyers’ 
ability to make fully informed decisions. The results of auditor failure can even be catastrophic, 
as in the case of a factory fire in Bangladesh that killed many workers even though a recent 
social audit had indicated that working conditions had improved (Yardley, 2012). Similarly, in 
2012, just weeks after social auditors certified that a factory in Pakistan met the SA8000 working 
conditions standard created by a respected nonprofit, a fire there killed hundreds of workers, 
some of whom were trapped by locked emergency exits and barred windows (Walsh and 
Greenhouse, 2012). For all these reasons, accurate supply chain monitoring is strategically 
critical for MNCs. 
Despite the importance of supply chain auditors, little is known about how they do their 
jobs. Much of the literature on private supply chain standards brackets the question of auditor 
performance or implicitly assumes that auditors provide reasonably objective assessments. To 
the extent that scholars address auditor performance, they have typically charged that supply 
chain auditors are biased in favor of their paying clients (O’Rourke, 2002; Esbenshade, 2004; 
Heras-Saizarbitoria and Boiral, 2013). Qualitative work reveals that auditors often deny their 
vulnerability to conflicts of interest and socially construct a professional identity that emphasizes 
auditor independence (Dogui, Boiral, & Gendron, 2013). To our knowledge, however, no 
research has rigorously investigated what factors shape supply chain auditors’ assessments.  
We seek to fill that gap. Drawing on insights from the literatures on street-level 
bureaucracy in government monitoring regimes and on regulatory and audit design, we theorize 
and investigate the factors that shape how auditors perceive and record supply chain factories’   4
violations of private standards. We argue that auditors are not objective transmitters of supply 
chain conditions. The information they transmit to their corporate clients is shaped by social 
relationships, institutions, and identities. In particular, we explore how auditors are influenced by 
their ongoing relationships with the audited factories and by the auditing team’s professional 
experience and gender composition. We thus move beyond the standard focus on financial 
conflicts of interest to explore other critical factors. 
We test our hypotheses in the context of social auditing for compliance with labor 
standards contained in corporate supplier codes of conduct. This form of private supply chain 
regulation has been adopted by all U.S. Fortune 500 companies and thousands of other 
prominent MNCs (McBarnet, 2007). The codes are imposed through contracts that stipulate not 
only transactional terms, such as price, quantity, delivery, and quality, but also social, 
environmental, and human-rights standards for production processes. The substance of these 
codes is highly consistent: They usually incorporate broad international consensus standards, 
such as the core labor standards of the International Labour Organization; require compliance 
with domestic labor, environmental, and human-rights laws; and specifically forbid practices 
such as child labor and prison labor even if such practices are legal in the supplier’s country or 
prohibited only by unenforced laws (McBarnet and Kurkchiyan, 2007). We exploit a novel 
dataset drawn from thousands of audits for code of conduct compliance in over 50 countries by 
one of the world’s largest supply chain auditing firms.  
The results of our analysis indicate the complexity of the social auditing process. We find 
that auditors’ decisions are shaped by factors such as ongoing client relationships, professional 
experience, gender, and gender diversity. These findings significantly broaden the prevailing 
understanding of the supply chain auditing process and they suggest ways to design more   5
effective monitoring regimes for private standards adherence in global supply chains. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a substantial literature on private standards governing supply chain practices. 
Scholars have investigated the private standard-setting process in organizations such as ISO 
(Wood, 2004) and the Forest Stewardship Council (Meidinger, 2002). Many studies have 
examined the adoption and diffusion of private supply chain standards, including industry-
specific programs and certification schemes (Hoffman, 2001; Bartley, 2007, 2010), the ISO 9001 
quality management standard (Guler, Guillén, and MacPherson, 2002; Christmann and Taylor, 
2006; Terlaak and King, 2006), and the ISO 14001 environmental management standard 
(Christmann and Taylor, 2001; Delmas, 2002; Potoski and Prakash, 2004; King, Lenox, and 
Terlaak, 2005; Prakash and Potoski, 2006; Boiral, 2007; Delmas and Montiel, 2008; Delmas and 
Toffel, 2008). While the strategy literature has long examined corporate social performance (e.g., 
Waddock and Graves, 1997; Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel, 2009; Surroca, Tribo, and Waddock, 
2010), scholars are increasingly examining supply chain management through a strategic lens 
(e.g., Parmigiani, 2007; Reitzig and Wagner, 2010; Alcacer and Oxley, 2013). 
There is a significant body of research on outcomes for firms that adopt supply chain 
standards. Several studies examine business outcomes such as competitiveness, sales, and stock 
performance (Delmas, 2001; Corbett, Montes-Sancho, and Kirsch, 2005; Terlaak and King, 
2006; Levine and Toffel, 2010), operational outcomes such as waste and pollution (King and 
Lenox, 2001; Potoski and Prakash, 2005a; Yin and Schmeidler, 2009), legal compliance (Potoski 
and Prakash, 2005b), and working conditions (Esbenshade, 2004; Rodríguez-Garavito, 2005; 
Locke and Romis, 2007; Kocer and Fransen, 2009; Levine and Toffel, 2010; Locke, Rising, and 
Pal, 2012). The strong consensus in the regulatory outcomes literature is that private standards   6
are most likely to improve performance when they are enforced by independent monitors 
(Potoski and Prakash, 2005b; Weil, 2005; Short and Toffel, 2010). 
While the supply chain standards literature generally assigns auditors a central role, little 
is known about how they perform their jobs. There has been psychological research on the 
cognitive motivations and biases of financial auditors (Tetlock, 1983; Glover, 1997; Hoffman 
and Patton, 1997; Asare, Trompeter, and Wright, 2000; Turner, 2001), but it is not clear that 
these findings apply to supply chain auditing. A few studies have used surveys to investigate the 
motivations, attitudes, and perceptions of supply chain auditors who monitor ISO 9001 
compliance (Williamson, Rogerson, and Vella, 1996; Power and Terziovski, 2007). Williamson 
et al. (1996) queried auditors about their understanding of the purpose of quality control 
auditing, the most valuable types of evidence for establishing compliance, and the most 
important constituency the audits were serving. Power and Terziovski (2007) surveyed auditors 
to assess auditing style—how rigidly auditors adhered to protocols. Neither of these studies 
attempted to link auditors’ attitudes, motivations, or styles to their job performance. Most 
pertinent to our investigation is a qualitative study of private social auditors who monitor 
factories in the Dominican Republic for labor standards compliance, which finds their work 
complements that of government labor inspectors because the groups face different incentives 
and political pressures (Amengual, 2010). Despite useful insight into possible influences on 
supply chain auditors, that study also highlights the need for more comprehensive and systematic 
analyses. Our study responds to this need and to recent calls for more empirical research into the 
process of supply chain auditing (Heras-Saizarbitoria and Boiral, 2013). 
Although there is very little empirical research on private compliance monitors, there is a 
substantial literature on government compliance monitors, or regulatory inspectors. Econometric   7
studies have revealed substantial heterogeneity in how government inspectors apply the 
regulations, but have not theorized the sources or patterns of this variation (Feinstein, 1989, 
1990; Macher, Mayo, and Nickerson, 2011; Lemley and Sampat, 2012). The literature on street-
level bureaucracy investigates how the interests and identities of individual bureaucrats—and the 
social institutions in which they are embedded—affect their exercise of discretion in 
implementing government regulatory regimes (Lipsky, 1980/2010; Brehm and Gates, 1997; 
Keiser and Soss, 1998; May and Winter, 2000; Sandfort, 2000; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 
2003; Piore, 2005; Piore and Schrank, 2008; Schrank, 2009), but has typically used qualitative 
case studies, without trying to extend its insights to private monitors. Our study extends these 
literatures to supply chain auditing for compliance with private standards for the first systematic, 
comprehensive investigation of the complex mix of factors that influence how these private-
sector monitors apply the standards they are charged with administering.  
HYPOTHESES 
Although the standards embodied in supplier codes of conduct are meant to constrain 
auditors’ individual discretion, studies of public regulatory implementation have shown that rules 
are not self-executing but rather acquire meaning from how they are enforced (Hawkins, 1984; 
Black, 1997). Street-level bureaucrats implementing government regulatory regimes must decide 
which rules apply to the facts they observe. Accordingly, though their work might be “rule-
saturated,” it is not necessarily “rule-bound” (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003: 10). Private-
sector supply chain auditors, too, must decide how to apply the standards they are responsible for 
implementing. Below, we hypothesize several factors that influence these decisions.  
Ongoing client relationships 
Supply chain auditors who repeatedly visit a factory are likely to be subject to social   8
pressures and cognitive biases that will influence which violations they detect and cite. Returning 
auditors may develop “cozy relationships” (Moore et al., 2006: 24) with factory management 
that encourage a “benefit of the doubt” style of enforcement rather than an arms-length 
“policing” style (Bardach and Kagan, 1982/2002). Moore et al. (2006), for instance, describe 
how financial auditors adopt the perspectives of their long-term clients, akin to regulatory 
capture (Muehlenbachs, Staubli, and Cohen, 2013: 11). Our interviews with social auditors 
revealed similar concerns that an auditor who keeps auditing the same facility may “go native,” 
becoming an extension of the factory’s management.  
Cognitive constraints also shape the number and type of violations auditors discover on 
consecutive visits. Bounded rationality limits the number of issues an auditor can pursue during 
an audit (Simon, 1947; Jones, 2001). As Chugh and Bazerman (2007: 3) have shown, “bounded 
awareness” causes individuals to “overfocus on some information and fail to use other easily 
available information.” Specifically, individuals tend to focus on information that comports with 
the tacit knowledge they have gained through experience. Though tacit knowledge can be a 
useful resource for decision makers, “dependence on tacit knowledge can create bounds on their 
awareness” (Kumar and Chakrabarti, 2012: 940). Management research has found that 
“managers use already established knowledge to determine what they see, and they use what 
they already know to choose what to look for in their environment” (von Krogh and Slocum, 
1994: 50). Huber and Power (1985: 172) observe that managers’ “perceptual and cognitive 
limitations” lead to errors. Henderson and Clark (1990) demonstrate, for instance, that engineers 
approach new problems through the lens of their experience solving previous problems, 
restricting their ability to identify innovative solutions. We argue that auditors will be subject to 
similar constraints: Returning to the same factory, they are likely to focus on the same domains   9
they highlighted previously, whereas a completely new audit team would examine a factory with 
a fresh set of eyes will focus on a different set of issues, likely uncovering new violations.  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): An audit will yield fewer violations when conducted by an audit team 
that includes a member of the factory’s previous audit team.  
Auditor tenure 
Scholars and activists have suggested that more experienced supply chain auditors are 
more effective (Esbenshade, 2004; Locke, Qin, and Brause, 2007). It is not clear, however, how 
experience affects the number of violations cited in a given audit. On the one hand, experience 
enhances the ability to identify violations, as would be expected and as has been documented in 
qualitative studies of government inspectors (Bardach and Kagan, 1982/2002). Our interviews 
with managers of social auditors also indicate that experience acquaints auditors with “tricks of 
the trade”—such as how to detect that a factory employs child labor even if child workers are not 
present during the audit—and that auditors exhibit “massive improvement” in their initial years 
on the job but that such marginal gains later diminish. 
On the other hand, it is not clear that more experienced auditors will cite more violations. 
On the contrary, scholarship on government regulatory agencies has suggested that new 
inspectors tend to exhibit “a more policing, nit-picking attitude” than more seasoned inspectors 
(Bardach and Kagan, 2002: 129). Inexperienced inspectors “know too little about the industries 
and operations they are inspecting” and thus “lack the confidence to evaluate actual levels of 
risk” posed by particular violations, so they tend to go by the book and cite everything (Bardach 
and Kagan, 1982/2002: 129). Experienced inspectors may decline to cite violations lacking the 
requisite level of risk and culpability (Bardach and Kagan, 1982/2002; Hawkins, 1984). We 
therefore expect that violation counts will initially rise with auditor tenure, as auditors gain the 
experience to detect violations, but that this effect will be tempered as experienced auditors gain   10
the confidence to exercise more discretion.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Audits conducted by more experienced auditor teams will yield more 
violations but at a decreasing rate. 
Professionalization 
Education and training should promote both detection and citation of violations (Chen, 
Chang, and Lee, 2008). More professionalized auditors may also feel more obligated to cite what 
they find. Sociologists have long theorized that professionalization—specialized education and 
training in a field’s skills and values—is a key constraint on individual discretion in both 
corporate and government bureaucracies (Scott, 1966; Larson, 1977; Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 
1994). Weber (1947) argued that professionals are governed by a shared commitment to the 
ethics and purposes of their profession, which can motivate them to act independently of 
hierarchical commands; Durkheim (1893/1984) suggested that the professions help sustain 
community by preserving and transmitting shared values.  
More recently, Lipsky (1980/2010: 201) argued that enhanced professionalism constrains 
the discretion of front-line workers in government bureaucracies: “[S]treet-level bureaucrats 
should be professionals whose relatively altruistic behavior, high standards, and self-monitoring 
substitute for what the society cannot dictate. Who will watch the watchmen? The watchmen will 
watch themselves.” Scholars have also suggested that professionalism can temper the influence 
of economic incentives on employees of for-profit corporations. For instance, Parker (1999) 
argues that if the staff of a corporate internal compliance program were more professionalized, it 
might be better equipped to contest the company’s profit-maximization imperatives in order to 
discourage wrongdoing. Although many have noted the gap between professionals’ value-
orientation in theory and their profit-orientation in practice (Thompson, 1967; Lipsky, 
1980/2010; Gordon and Simon, 1992), professionalism remains one of the few mechanisms   11
available to create “islands of civic virtue … in a world of generalized self-seeking” (Gordon and 
Simon, 1992: 235). Research has demonstrated that professionalization improved the efficacy of 
government labor inspectors (Piore, 2005; Schrank, 2009). We therefore expect that teams whose 
auditors are more professionalized will record more violations. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Audits conducted by teams that include auditors who are more 
professionalized will yield more violations.  
Gender 
Research has suggested that, even when constrained by bureaucratic rules and roles, men 
and women may perform their work “somewhat differently” (Eagly and Johannesen-Schmindt, 
2001: 783). Several gender-based behavioral distinctions documented in the literature can 
influence whether social auditors discover—and then, whether they cite—violations. Research 
has shown that women are more persistent at pursuing assigned tasks (Stonewater, Eveslage, and 
Dingerson, 1990; Spence and Buckner, 2000; Jacob, 2002), suggesting more diligent 
enforcement of regulations. Research has also found that women have perceptual and integrative 
processing advantages that may enhance their ability to detect violations. For example, women 
have been found to be more skilled at interpreting the emotional content of others’ expressions 
(Thayer and Johnsen, 2000; Killgore and Cupp, 2002; Campanella et al., 2004) and to be “more 
sensitive to subtle stimulus” (Darley and Smith, 1995: 43). Research has also found that women 
tend to use a more comprehensive information-processing style, whereby they “attempt to 
assimilate all available cues” (Darley and Smith, 1995: 43). According to Gold, Hunton, and 
Gomaa (2009: 3): 
[W]omen tend to integrate more of the available evidential cues into their judgments, 
reflecting an intense level of cognitive processing. Men, on the other hand, tend to 
eliminate what they deem to be irrelevant cues and focus on a limited set of salient pieces 
of information that are relatively easy and quick to process.  
 
Thus, women’s information-gathering and processing style may better equip them to perceive   12
violations in a complex factory setting and to elicit information about violations from employees. 
Moreover, research suggests that women are more likely to cite the violations they 
perceive. Women in bureaucratic organizations are more likely than men to be strict rule-
followers (Portillo and DeHart-Davis, 2009; Oberfield, 2010; Portillo, 2012). A long line of 
sociological scholarship has argued generally that “rules are a means of asserting power for the 
less powerful” (Portillo, 2012: 91) and that low-status members of organizations use rules as a 
source of authority to compensate for their lack of personal authority (Green and Melnick, 1950; 
Kanter, 1977; Thompson, 1977). We are not aware of any research on women’s status in supply 
chain auditing, but research on financial auditors and auditing firms suggests that, even as many 
women have entered that profession, audit firms have maintained masculine organizational 
cultures that tend to devalue women’s contributions (Jonnergård, Stafsudd, and Elg, 2010; 
Mueller, Carter, and Ross-Smith, 2011; Haynes, 2012). Our interviews with social auditors suggest 
that, especially in societies with more rigid gender hierarchies, factory managers view male 
auditors as more authoritative. Empirical studies of government workers have found that women 
do indeed “go by the book” (Green and Melnick, 1950; Portillo and DeHart-Davis, 2009; 
Portillo, 2012: 90) more strictly than their male colleagues do. All this evidence suggests that 
gender will significantly influence whether supply chain auditors detect and cite violations. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Audits conducted by all-female teams will yield more violations than 
those conducted by all-male teams. 
Gender diversity 
Supply chain auditing teams are not necessarily all-male or all-female. In the 
organizational literature on teams, there is significant debate about the effects of diversity, 
including gender diversity, on team performance (Joshi and Roh, 2009; Phillips et al., 2012). We 
expect that gender diversity will enhance a supply chain auditing team’s performance because of   13
complementary perceptual styles and interpersonal dynamics.  
First, women’s and men’s different perceptual styles may cause them to identify different 
types of violation, enabling mixed-gender teams to find more. This should be particularly 
valuable in eliciting information from a diverse set of supply chain employees and managers. 
Research has demonstrated that, for a variety of reasons, “diversity in groups increases the 
likelihood that there will be access to different information in a group” (Phillips et al., 2012: 
161). Our interviews with social auditors indicate that factories subjected to social audits tend to 
have predominantly female workers and male managers and that the female workers are more 
likely to communicate openly with female auditors, while, as one interviewee put it, male factory 
managers, “for cultural reasons, may find it difficult…to open up to women.”  
Second, research has shown how the interpersonal dynamics of gender diversity can 
improve team performance. For instance, studies find that people on socially diverse teams tend 
to prepare more thoroughly and to think through a broader range of issues (Loyd et al., 2013). 
Fenwick and Neal report the superior performance of gender-diverse teams at management-
simulation exercises, crediting it to the “mix of male and female operating, decision-making and 
leadership styles” (2001: 217). Furthermore, men on mixed teams may try harder if they see they 
are being outperformed by women. Studies have shown that lower-performing team members 
often compare themselves to better performers, which tends to raise their “usual performance 
levels in order to match or beat the stronger performers” (Collins, 2000; Lount, Jr. and Phillips, 
2007; Weber, Wittchen, and Hertel, 2009: 732). Weber, Wittchen, and Hertel (2009) demonstrate 
that men are particularly prone to such competitive behavior. Male auditors may therefore feel 
compelled to match or exceed their female teammates’ citation rates.  
Although some conflicting evidence suggests that gender diversity can sometimes   14
undermine team performance, a recent meta-study found that gender diversity is particularly 
likely to enhance performance in service industries, where team members interact directly with 
clients (Joshi and Roh, 2009). Because supply chain auditing is a service industry and auditors 
interact a lot with clients, we expect that gender diversity will improve team performance. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Audits conducted by gender-diverse teams will yield more violations 
than those conducted by single-gender teams.  
 
DATA AND MEASURES  
Empirical context and sample  
To test our hypotheses, we obtained data for thousands of code-of-conduct audits 
conducted in over 60 countries between 2004 and 2009 by one of the world’s largest social-
auditing companies.
2 During that period, the company, which already had more than a decade’s 
experience, employed several hundred people in many countries; they spoke over 30 languages.  
The dataset contains audit results for and information about each audited factory, 
including its country and a unique identifier; characteristics and unique identifiers for the 
auditors on each audit; and the country and a unique identifier for the client on whose behalf 
each audit was conducted. The auditor preserved anonymity of the factories, auditors, and clients 
by not revealing their names. Our estimations are based on the 16,795 audits of 5,819 factories 
(in 66 countries) for which we had data on all the measures described below and which had been 
audited at least twice during the sample period (a technical requirement owing to our models 
being estimated with factory-level fixed effects, described below). Industry composition of our 
sample is reported in Table 1; the most common are garments, accessories, electronics, and toys.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
In nearly all cases, brands determined (a) which factories would be audited and (b) 
                                                 
2 The company required anonymity as a condition of sharing its data with us.   15
whether the brand or the factory (or its agents) would pay. Our interviews indicated that this 
decision was not driven by the factory’s managerial attitude, violation rate, or improvement rate. 
(Factories sometimes sought and paid for audits when they sought to become certified to a third-
party standard such as SA8000. As described later, our results are robust to omitting from the 
estimation sample the very small proportion of audits that used third-party protocols.)  
Dependent variable 
We measure the extent to which factories adhere to codes of conduct as the number of 
violations in each audit, obtained from the social auditing firm’s database. We include only the 
types of violation that, according to the social auditing firm (hereafter referred to as “the auditing 
firm”), apply in all industries and are interpreted by auditors in the same way in all countries; 
namely, violations of rules for child labor, forced or compulsory labor, working hours, 
occupational health and safety, minimum wage, treatment of foreign workers and subcontractors, 
and disciplinary practices.
3 During an audit, the auditors code a common set of dichotomous 
indicators (violation or no violation) in each category.
4  
Independent variables  
To identify the potential for auditors’ career concerns to influence their behavior, we 
coded previous auditor as 1 when at least one member of the focal audit team had participated in 
one of the factory’s previous audits during the sample period and 0 otherwise.  
We measure the experience of the auditors on each team as their years of service at the 
auditing firm. Using the auditor’s database, we calculated maximum tenure as the highest 
                                                 
3 We exclude other categories that, according to our auditor interviews, applied only to factories in particular 
industries or that were interpreted differently in different countries: the right of association, the right to organize and 
bargain collectively, legal client regulation, dormitory conditions, and canteen violations.  
4 The occupational health and safety category, for example, consists of seven indicators pertinent to emergency 
preparedness (blocked or locked aisles or exits, inadequate first-aid supplies, insufficient emergency exits, lack of 
emergency lighting, lack of employee emergency training, lack of an evacuation plan, and unmarked aisles), five 
indicators of fire safety, eight related to toilets, and eight related to the work floor.   16
number of years that any member of the audit team had worked at the company. (Using average 
tenure rather than maximum tenure yielded nearly identical results.)  
We measure the professionalism of the audit team in two ways. Because one important 
source of professionalization is “standardized formal training in universities” (Lipsky, 
1980/2010: 201), we code graduate education 1 when at least one member of the audit team 
possessed a graduate degree and 0 otherwise. We focused on graduate education because nearly 
all auditors in our dataset possessed a bachelor’s degree.
5 We also created auditing skills training 
as the highest number of the auditing firm’s training courses that any audit team member had 
completed. These courses teach skills such as how to interpret national labor laws and how to 
detect payroll manipulation that might indicate wage violations. (Using the average rather than 
the maximum number of training courses yielded nearly identical results.)  
We measure gender composition with three dummy variables—all-female audit team, 
all-male audit team, and mixed-gender audit team.
6  
Control variables 
Training can influence the stringency of government regulators (Macher, Mayo, and 
Nickerson, 2011) and might also influence an audit team’s ability to detect and report violations. 
We thus control for two types of training. Using the auditor’s database, we calculated the 
proportion of each team that had undergone certification training—training on the standards and 
protocols of a particular certification regime, such as SA8000—and the proportion that had 
undergone brand training—training provided by the brand on its corporate responsibility 
                                                 
5 We coded graduate education as a dichotomous variable rather than a continuous measure to better reflect the near-
binary distribution in our sample: 87 percent of the audit teams had no members with a master’s degree, 7 percent 
had all members with a master’s degree, and a mere 6 percent had an intermediate configuration. 
6 We use these dummies rather than a continuous measure such as proportion female because the database indicated 
that 97 percent of the audit teams in our sample were all-female, all-male, or evenly divided. Thus, the three 
dummies represent the distribution of our data.   17
program and procedures.  
We control for auditors’ age to ensure that the effects of auditor tenure can be attributed 
to job experience rather than to the life-cycle effects posited by human capital theory (Diamond, 
Jr., 1984), which predicts “an inverse U-shaped relationship between productivity and age” 
(Teitelbaum, 2006: 166). Because the auditing firm provided only five-year age-range categories 
(for example, 20–24 years old) for each auditor to keep precise ages confidential, we created a 
proxy for the team’s average age. Specifically, we calculated the midpoint for each category and 
then created average age as the average of the oldest and youngest age-range categories on a 
team. (Using the oldest team member’s age rather than the average yielded nearly identical 
results.) 
We created a dummy variable to indicate whether an audit used a third-party protocol—
such as that of the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI), the Initiative Clause Sociale 
(ICS), the Sedex Members Ethical Trade Audit (SMETA), the International Council of Toy 
Industries (ICTI), or Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP)—because such 
protocols might limit an auditor’s discretion.  
We also control for whether an audit is unannounced or pre-announced. The latter 
provides several weeks of notice, giving the factory time to try to remedy problems, which could 
result in fewer violations to find. In contrast, a factory does not know the date of an unannounced 
audit. We created a dummy variable, unannounced audit, coded 1 for an unannounced audit and 
0 for a pre-announced audit. 
Because research has indicated that financial conflicts of interest created by client fees 
undermine auditors’ and inspectors’ ability to police corporate misconduct (Cantor and Packer, 
1994; Bazerman, Morgan, and Loewenstein, 1997; Oh, 2004; Moore et al., 2006; Partnoy, 2006;   18
Dallas, 2011; Estlund, 2012; Manns, 2013; Pierce and Toffel, 2013), we control for which entity 
paid for each audit. Using the auditing firm’s database, we created two dichotomous variables. 
Audit paid for by factory or agent identifies audits with the potential for financial conflict of 
interest. It is coded 1 for audits paid for by the audited factory, agents, vendors, or licensees, and 
0 for audits paid for by the brand.
7 Audit paid for by brand is coded in the opposite manner.  
We include dummy variables to control for the number of auditors on each audit (two 
through five, with one as the omitted category). Audit team size is a direct function of factory 
size and complexity in our setting, but others have shown that larger teams of government 
inspectors can lead to more stringent monitoring (Muehlenbachs, Staubli, and Cohen, 2013).  
We created a dummy variable re-audit to distinguish routine audits from re-audits, which 
tend to focus on domains where violations were previously identified and thus yield fewer 
violations than routine audits. We also include a series of dummies to indicate a factory’s audit 
sequence—its second audit, third audit, and so on through sixth-or-higher audit (because only 5 
percent of the audits in our sample were a factory’s seventh or higher audit), with a factory’s first 
audit as the omitted category—to control for the possibility that successive audits yield fewer 
violations as factories address the issues exposed. (Using an audit sequence counter variable and 
its square rather than the dummies yielded nearly identical results.)
  
To capture domestic institutional factors that could influence a factory’s compliance with 
codes of conduct (Toffel, Short, and Ouellet, 2013), we control for several country-level 
governmental, economic, and civil-society attributes. We measure the average economic 
                                                 
7 We combined these categories of payer because prior research and our auditor interviews suggest that, in our 
empirical context, the financial incentives of factories and these intermediaries are closely aligned. In developing 
economies, intermediaries’ role is to promote exports by domestic manufacturers by identifying new markets for 
their goods and services (Ellis, 2010) and by reducing transaction-cost barriers to export (Ahn, Khandelwal, and 
Shang-Jin, 2011). Our results are robust to an alternative specification in which we include two dummies that 
control for audits paid for by factories as distinct from audits paid for by agents, vendors, or licensees.   19
development level of a factory’s country as its annual per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
in 2005 dollars, calculated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service 
(obtained from http://www.ers.usda.gov). To reduce skew, we use the log. To measure the extent 
to which the government of the audited factory’s country fosters a regulatory environment 
promoting economic development, we use the annual regulatory quality metric, calculated by the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators project (obtained from 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators) to capture “perceptions 
of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development” (World Bank, 2013).  
We measure the extent of press freedom in the audited factory’s country via the annual 
Press Freedom Index produced by Reporters without Borders (obtained from http://en.rsf.org). 
This index incorporates the extent to which journalists face direct and indirect threats—including 
imprisonment, physical attacks, censorship, and self-censorship—and the number of journalists 
detained, murdered, physically attacked, or threatened. We create press freedom by reverse-
coding the Press Freedom Index, so that a higher score represents more press freedom, and then 
rescaling the result to range from 0 to 1. 
Summary statistics and correlations are reported in Tables 2 and 3. 
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
Our empirical model includes all independent and control variables described above and 
three sets of fixed effects. We include fixed effects for each audited factory to control for time-
invariant factory characteristics that might affect its violation rate, such as size, age, industry,   20
and national institutional context.
8 A series of dummies for the year in which the audit was 
conducted controls for overall temporal trends. We also include fixed effects for the headquarters 
country of the brand on whose behalf each audit was conducted. This controls for the possibility 
that consumers and activist groups in brand countries vary in their concern for and attentiveness 
to supply chain conditions, which might in turn affect how much pressure buyers exert on their 
auditors to audit stringently. These fixed effects also control for all other time-invariant 
differences between brand headquarters countries’ institutional contexts.  
Our identification strategy is based on the fact that the process of assigning auditors to 
audit teams is unrelated to our independent variables and thus is not a source of endogeneity that 
should bias their coefficients. Specifically, our interviews with the social-auditing firm indicated 
that assignments were based on (1) language skills to communicate with management and 
workers; (2) availability; and (3) the need for at least one team member to qualify as a senior 
auditor.  
We estimate the model using Poisson regression with robust standard errors and report 
our results in Column 1 of Table 4. Negative-binomial regression with conditional fixed effects 
yields nearly identical results, indicating that our results are not sensitive to estimation technique.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Results 
The significant negative coefficient on previous auditor (= -0.04; p = 0.03; IRR = 0.96) 
indicates that audits yield 4 percent fewer violations when a team member had participated in a 
prior audit at the same factory, which supports Hypothesis 1. The average marginal effect (AME) 
                                                 
8 Because factory-level fixed effects in our model absorb the time-invariant portion of factory country-level 
variables, per-capita gross domestic product (GDP), regulatory quality, and press freedom effectively control for 
within-country temporal variation in their effect on factory violation rates.   21
of -0.3 indicates that, compared to the sample average of 6.5 violations, an audit by a team with a 
previous auditor would yield 6.2 violations. 
The audit team’s maximum tenure has a significant positive coefficient ( = 0.07; p < 
0.01) and its square term has a significant negative coefficient ( = -0.004; p < 0.01), implying 
that the number of violations cited increases as tenure increases but at a diminishing rate, which 
supports Hypothesis 2. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1, which graphs average 
predicted violations at varying levels of the audit team’s maximum experience.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Our results are mixed with respect to professionalization. The coefficient on graduate 
education is positive as predicted but not significant, yielding no evidence that audits conducted 
by audit teams with more formal education yielded significantly more violations. Audits did 
yield significantly more violations when conducted by more professionalized auditors as 
measured by auditor training ( = 0.02; p < 0.01; IRR = 1.02). This result is not driven by age or 
tenure because we control for these factors. The average marginal effect indicates that each 
additional training course (pursued by the most highly trained member of the team) is associated 
with an additional 0.14 violations. In other words, an audit team whose most highly trained 
member had taken nine training courses would, on average, cite one more violation than a team 
whose most highly trained member had taken two training courses. Jointly, these results yield 
some support for Hypothesis 3, but only when professionalization is measured by specific 
training rather than by broader education. 
Team gender composition is also significantly associated with the number of violations 
reported. Audits by all-female teams yield 6 percent more than those by all-male teams (the 
baseline) ( = 0.05; p < 0.01; IRR = 1.05), which supports Hypothesis 4. The average marginal   22
effect indicates that audits by all-female teams yield 0.35 more violations than those by all-male 
teams (the baseline category).  
Mixed-gender teams yield on average 7 percent more violations—or nearly half a 
violation more—than all-male teams (the baseline) ( = 0.07; p < 0.01; IRR = 1.07) and slightly 
more violations than all-female teams (AME = 0.1), but the latter difference is not statistically 
distinguishable (
2 = 0.55; p = 0.46). These results partially support Hypothesis 5.  
The coefficients on second inspection through sixth or more inspection are negative and 
statistically significant. Wald tests comparing these coefficients indicate that, on average, each 
successive audit yields significantly fewer violations. Average marginal effects indicate that, on 
average, a factory’s second audit yields nearly one fewer violation than its initial audit during our 
sample period (= -0.15; p < 0.01; AME = -0.9), its third audit yields 1.3 fewer than its second 
audit (AME = -2.2, a statistically significant decline: Wald 
2 = 114; p < 0.01), and its fourth 
audit yields 0.6 fewer than its third audit (AME = -2.8, a statistically significant decline: Wald 
2 
= 20; p < 0.01). This relationship is also apparent in the summary statistics depicted in Figure 2. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Consistent with assigning more auditors to larger factories, which are likely to generate 
more violations, we find that audits with more auditors yield significantly more violations. We 
find no evidence that the number of violations varied with the team’s certification training, brand 
training, or average age or with a third-party protocol. Our point estimate indicates that 
unannounced audits yielded slightly more violations than announced audits at a given factory 
(AME = 0.2), but the difference was outside conventional significance levels (p = 0.15). 
Audits paid for by factories or agents yielded 8 percent fewer violations than audits paid 
for by brands, the baseline category (= -0.08; p < 0.01; IRR = 0. 92). The average marginal   23
effect indicates that, on average, audits yield 0.6 fewer violations when the factory or agent pays 
than when the brand pays, a drop from 6.5 to 5.9.  
Audits yielded fewer violations in countries with greater per capita GDP (= -0.62; p = 
0.02; AME = -4.0) and in those with greater press freedom ( = -0.51; p = 0.02; AME = 3.3). 
Our point estimate indicates fewer violations at factories in countries with higher regulatory 
quality, but the relationship was not statistically significant ( = -0.18; p = 0.22).  
Robustness tests  
When we estimated the model using negative binomial regression instead of Poisson 
regression and when we used alternative measures of the audit team’s experience (mean instead 
of maximum tenure), training (average rather than maximum number of training courses), and 
age (the age of the oldest member rather than the average of the oldest and youngest members’ 
ages) and an alternative approach to controlling for the factory’s audit sequence (a counter and 
its square instead of dummies), the results were nearly identical to our primary results.  
We also estimated our primary model on various subsamples to assess the extent to which 
our results were driven by certain types of audit. Column 2 of Table 4 reports estimates after 
excluding the 210 audits performed for clients whose audit teams were always all-female, in case 
that pattern reflected a client policy that might bias our primary results. Column 3 reports 
estimates based on the 10,648 audits conducted by teams of at least two members to ensure that 
our results were not driven by single-auditor audits. Column 4 reports estimates of the model 
after excluding the 751 audits conducted according to third-party protocols, in case the influence 
of such protocols on the discovery or reporting of violations is not adequately controlled for with 
the dummy variable used in our main specification and because factories themselves might have 
chosen the protocol and auditor in these cases. Column 5 reports results for the subsample of   24
9,266 audits that excludes each factory’s first inspection in our sample; some of those might have 
been pre-assessments of factories that clients had not yet engaged and our hypothesized 
relationships might operate differently in such circumstances. Our results are quite robust across 
these subsamples. The sign and magnitude of all hypothesized variable coefficients are very 
similar to our main results.  
DISCUSSION 
Our research theorized and tested several social factors that shape supply chain auditors’ 
ability to identify and report violations of supplier codes of conduct. We find that auditors’ 
decisions are shaped not only by the financial conflicts of interest that have been the focus of 
research to date, but also by social factors, including auditors’ experience, professional training, 
and gender; the gender diversity of their teams; and their repeated interactions with those whom 
they audit. These findings contribute to several literatures and suggest strategies for designing 
private monitoring regimes to provide companies with more reliable strategic information. 
Contributions to auditing and gatekeeping research 
Although much is known about the adoption, diffusion, and outcomes of supply chain 
standards and codes of conduct that require auditing, the practices of the auditors themselves 
have largely remained a black box. We illuminate how auditing practices implemented on the 
ground—at the micro level—are influenced by several key auditor characteristics.  
 Prior literature exploring auditor bias has focused on economic incentives and conflicts 
of interest when those being audited are paying for the audits. Our analysis indicates that while 
economic incentives play a role, private-sector auditor behavior is also significantly influenced 
by social institutions, identities, and relationships. Our finer-grained picture suggests that audit 
designers should moderate potential bias and increase audit reliability by considering the   25
auditors’ characteristics and relationships that we found significantly influencing their decisions.  
Our findings should likewise inform the broader literature on private gatekeepers such as 
accountants and credit rating agencies, subjects of much interest since their failures to detect and 
reveal corporate wrongdoing led to corporate scandals and financial meltdowns in the early 
twenty-first century (Bratton, 2002; Partnoy, 2004). However, the gatekeeper literature, like the 
auditing literature, has focused almost exclusively on the influence of economic conflicts of 
interest (Cantor and Packer, 1994; Bazerman, Morgan, and Loewenstein, 1997; Goldberg, 1988; 
Schwarcz, 2002; Hill, 2004; Oh, 2004; Moore et al., 2006; Partnoy, 2006; Dallas, 2011; Manns, 
2013). Our study suggests the need to also look at other factors to structure more effective 
gatekeeping regimes.  
Contributions to research on public-sector monitors  
By drawing on research on street-level bureaucracy in government regulatory agencies to 
predict the behavior of private-sector supply-chain auditors, our study initiates a needed dialogue 
between literatures on public- and private-sector monitoring that until now have each missed 
important insights offered by the other. Calls for insight into the micro-level processes of private 
supply-chain auditing (Heras-Saizarbitoria and Boiral, 2013) have overlooked the extensive 
literature on street-level policy implementation by government monitors while street-level 
bureaucracy research has largely ignored front-line implementation by private-sector monitors 
who play an increasingly important role in regulating corporate conduct. Our study extends both 
literatures by elaborating micro-level implementation processes in the context of private-sector 
auditing. 
We extend economic research on government regulatory inspectors by investigating how 
experience affects stringency. Several studies document less stringency among more-experienced   26
government monitors, including patent examiners (Lemley and Sampat, 2012) and U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration inspectors of pharmaceutical plants (Macher, Mayo, and Nickerson, 
2011). But these tell only one side, failing to document the initial gains from experience that we 
found. We similarly contribute to economic literature on human capital theory (Diamond, Jr., 
1984) by demonstrating that the predicted “inverse U-shaped relationship between productivity 
and age” (Teitelbaum, 2006: 166) may be driven by experience rather than by age. 
Contributions to research on transnational business regulation  
Supply chain auditing has become an important component of international regulatory 
strategies that seek to address the social and environmental risks of business activities beyond the 
reach of state governments (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Scott, 2012). Private labeling regimes 
such as the Forest Stewardship Council, the Marine Stewardship Council, and Fair Trade rely on 
private third-party auditors. International intergovernmental institutions such as the United 
Nations have encouraged supply chain auditing by requesting that TNCs conduct “due diligence” 
to ensure their suppliers’ compliance with international human rights norms (Shamir, 2005; 
Ruggie, 2008; Kamatali, 2012). Many national regulators have followed suit, requiring MNCs to 
conduct due diligence and disclose supply chain practices. The efficacy and legitimacy of these 
efforts largely depends on the credibility of monitoring; our study responds to calls for more 
empirical research on the key actors (Büthe, 2010). While our findings of auditor heterogeneity 
support those who question auditor independence and objectivity (Power, 1997; Boiral and 
Gendron, 2011), our identification of several systematic determinants of that heterogeneity 
suggests how companies and policymakers can improve audit validity.  
Implications for managers 
Our finding that auditors tend to cite fewer violations at factories where they have   27
ongoing relationships empirically supports those who advocate auditor rotation to prevent 
capture by long-term clients (Moore et al., 2006; U.S. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board, 2011). That auditors returning to the same factory might consistently deemphasize some 
areas (and thus inadvertently overlook violations) should also encourage auditing firms and the 
brands that hire them to ensure rotation.
9 Our findings also highlight the importance of training 
for private-sector monitors. While auditors with higher educational credentials did not find 
significantly more violations than less educated peers, those with more audit-specific training 
did. Finally, our findings suggest that auditing teams can benefit from experience and from 
gender diversity, although managers should be aware that the benefits of the former attenuate. 
Limitations and future research  
Given the nature of our large quantitative study, we are unable to identify the precise 
mechanisms by which the factors we identify influence individual auditor decisions. We 
encourage future research to investigate the social processes underlying these outcomes.  
Our many discussions with social auditors, including employees of the firm that provided 
our data and of competing firms, yielded no reason to suspect that endogeneity concerns are 
driving our results. These discussions indicated that audit team assignments were driven largely 
by language skills, industry expertise, availability, and the need for each team to have a qualified 
lead auditor. Our discussions also indicated that brands determine which factories are audited, 
which obviates the risk of a selection effect whereby better-than-average or worse-than-average 
factories might choose to be audited or to pay for their own audits, as in some voluntary 
environmental programs (King and Toffel, 2009). Even so, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
omitted variables are correlated with our independent variables and violation rates; we therefore 
                                                 
9 A few auditing schemes have explicitly stipulated term limits for auditing companies; for example, California’s 
Greenhouse Gas regulation requires regulated entities to change verification companies every six years.   28
encourage future randomized field experiments (e.g., Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Sequeira, 2011).  
Our findings relating to gender and gender diversity may be influenced by the gender 
composition of the workforce at audited factories. Although we do not have such demographic 
data, available meta-data and our own interviews with social auditors suggest that women 
dominate the workforce in export-intensive industries such as garments, textiles, and electronics, 
which account for most of our sample (Jenkins, Esquivel, and Larrían, 2001; Dejardin and 
Owens, 2009; Kuncoro, 2011). Future research could explore how auditors’ decisions are 
influenced by the interaction of the gender compositions of the audit team and the audited 
organization.  
Future research can also explore how auditors’ decisions are influenced by various short- 
and long-term organizational structures and incentives. For instance, differing compensation 
systems may influence the extent to which supply chain auditors’ decisions are shaped by 
economic incentives and other factors. Field experiments might shed light on which types of 
technical and managerial training most improve the objectivity of auditors’ decisions. More 
broadly, it will be important to investigate whether our findings are generalizable to different 
types of private gatekeeper, such as financial auditors, credit ratings agencies, and attorneys. Do 
they respond similarly to economic incentives, professional obligations, and social pressures? 
Finally, direct comparisons of the implementation practices of private-sector monitors such as 
social auditors and of public monitors such as government inspectors would promote better 
understanding of the efficacy and legitimacy of both.  
CONCLUSION 
Although private supply chain auditors are increasingly important to strategic corporate 
decisions and to public and private regulation, they have seldom attracted academic attention.   29
Our investigation of supply chain auditing practices at thousands of factories around the world 
reveals several social factors that influence auditors’ decisions. More broadly, our work 
contributes to literatures on private supply chain monitoring, private gatekeeping, street-level 
bureaucracy, and transnational business regulation and highlights opportunities to improve the 
design and implementation of auditing regimes that rely on private-sector monitors. 
REFERENCES 
Abbott, A. 1988. The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
AFL-CIO. 2013. Responsibility Outsourced: Social Audits, Workplace Certification and Twenty 
Years of Failure to Protect Worker Rights. Washington, DC: American Federation of Labor-
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). 
Ahn, J., A. K. Khandelwal, and S. Wei. 2011. The role of intermediaries in facilitating trade. 
Journal of International Economics 84(4): 73–85. 
Alcacer, J., and J. Oxley. 2013. Learning by supplying. Strategic Management Journal 35(2): 
204–223. 
Amengual, M. 2010. Complementary labor regulation: The uncoordinated combination of state 
and private regulators in the Dominican Republic. World Development 38(3): 405–414. 
Asare, S. K., G. M. Trompeter, and A. M. Wright. 2000. The effect of accountability and time 
budgets on auditors’ testing strategies. Contemporary Accounting Research 17(4): 539–560. 
Bansal, P. 2005. Evolving sustainably: A longitudinal study on corporate sustainable 
development. Strategic Management Journal 26: 197–218.  
Bardach, E., and R. A. Kagan. 1982/2002. Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory 
Unreasonableness. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. 
Bartley, T. 2007. Institutional emergence in an era of globalization: The rise of transnational 
private regulation of labor and environmental conditions. American Journal of Sociology 
113(2): 297–351. 
Bartley, T. 2010. Transnational private regulation in practice: The limits of forest and labor 
standards certification in Indonesia. Business and Politics 12(3): Article 7. 
Bazerman, M. H., K. Morgan, and G. F. Loewenstein. 1997. The impossibility of auditor 
independence. MIT Sloan Management Review 38(4): 89–94. 
Berrone, P., A. Fosfuri, L. Gelabert, and L. Gomez-Maria. 2013. Necessity as the mother of 
“green” inventions: Institutional pressures and environmental innovations. Strategic 
Management Journal 34: 891–909.  
Black, J. 1997. Rules and Regulators. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. 
Boiral, O. 2007. Corporate greening through ISO 14001: A rational myth? Organization Science 
18: 127–146. 
Boiral, O., and Y. Gendron. 2011. Sustainable development and certification practices: Lessons 
learned and prospects. Business Strategy and the Environment 20: 331–347. 
Braithwaite, J., and P. Drahos. 2000. Global Business Regulation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.   30
Bratton, W. W. 2002. Enron and the dark side of shareholder value. Tulane Law Review 76: 
1275–1361. 
Brehm, J., and S. Gates. 1997. Working, Shirking, and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a 
Democratic Public. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.  
Büthe, T. 2010. Global private politics: A research agenda. Business and Politics 12(3): Article 
12. 
Campanella, S., M. Rossignol, S. Mejias, F. Joassin, P. Maurage, D. Debatisse, R. Bruyer, M. 
Commelinck, and J.-M. Guerit. 2004. Human gender differences in an emotional visual 
oddball task: An event-related potentials study. Neuroscience Letters 367(1): 14–18.  
Cantor, R., and F. Packer. 1994. The credit rating industry. Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Quarterly 19: 1–26. 
Chatterji, A. K., D. I. Levine, and M. W. Toffel. 2009. How well do social ratings actually 
measure corporate social responsibility? Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 
18(1): 125–169.  
Chen, Y., B. Chang, and C. Lee. 2008. The association between continuing professional 
education and financial performance of public accounting firms. International Journal of 
Human Resource Management 19(9): 1720–1737. 
Christmann, P., and G. Taylor. 2001. Globalization of the environment: Determinants of firm 
self-regulation in China. Journal of International Business Studies 32: 439–458. 
Christmann, P., and G. Taylor. 2006. Firm self-regulation through international certifiable 
standards: Determinants of symbolic versus substantive implementation. Journal of 
International Business Studies 37: 863–883. 
Chugh, D., and M. H. Bazerman. 2007. Bounded awareness: What you fail to see can hurt you. 
Mind and Society 6: 1–18. 
Collins, R. L. 2000. Among the better ones: Upward assimilation in social comparison. In J. Suls 
and L. Wheeler (eds.), Handbook of Social Comparison: Theory and Research: 159–172. 
New York: Plenum. 
Corbett, C. J., M. J. Montes-Sancho, and D. A. Kirsch. 2005. The financial impact of ISO 9000 
certification in the United States: An empirical analysis. Management Science 51(7): 1046–
1059. 
Dallas, L. L. 2011. Short-termism, the financial crisis, and corporate governance. Journal of 
Corporation Law 37(2): 264–363. 
Darley, W. K., and R. E. Smith. 1995. Gender differences in information processing strategies: 
An empirical test of the selectivity model in advertising response. Journal of Advertising 
24(1): 41–56. 
Dejardin, A. K., and J. Owens. 2009. Asia in the Global Economic Crisis: Impacts and 
Responses from a Gender Perspective. Bangkok: International Labour Organization Regional 
Office for Asia and the Pacific. 
Delmas, M. 2001. Stakeholders and competitive advantage: The case of ISO 14001. Production 
and Operations Management 10: 343–358. 
Delmas, M. 2002. The diffusion of environmental management standards in Europe and in the 
United States: An institutional perspective. Policy Sciences 35: 91–119. 
Delmas, M. A., and I. Montiel. 2008. The diffusion of voluntary international management 
standards: Responsible care, ISO 9000 and ISO 14001 in the chemical industry. Policy 
Studies Journal 1: 65–93. 
Delmas, M., and M. W. Toffel. 2008. Organizational responses to environmental demands:   31
Opening the black box. Strategic Management Journal 29(10): 1027–1055. 
Diamond, A. M., Jr. 1984. An economic model of the life-cycle research productivity of 
scientists. Scientometrics 6: 189–196. 
Dogui, K., O. Boiral, and Y. Gendron. 2013. ISO auditing and the construction of trust in auditor 
independence. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 26(8): 1279–1305. 
Duhigg, C., and D. Barboza. 2012. The iEconomy, Part 2: A punishing system. In China, the 
human costs that are built into an iPad. New York Times, January 26: A1.  
Durkheim, E. 1893/1984. The Division of Labor in Society, trans. W. D. Halls. New York: Free 
Press. 
Eagly, A. H., and M. C. Johannesen-Schmindt. 2001. Leadership styles of women and men. 
Journal of Social Issues 57(4): 781–797. 
Ellis, P. D. 2010. International trade intermediaries. In Wiley International Encyclopedia of 
Marketing, Part 6. International Marketing. DOI: 10.1002/9781444316568.wiem06040. 
Esbenshade, J. 2004. Monitoring Sweatshops: Workers, Consumers and the Global Apparel 
Industry. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Estlund, C. 2012. Enforcement of private transnational labor regulation: A new frontier in the 
anti-sweatshop movement? In F. Cafaggi (ed.), Enforcement of Transnational Regulation: 
Ensuring Compliance in a Global World: 237–262. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Feinstein, J. S. 1989. The safety regulation of U.S. nuclear power plants: Violations, inspections, 
and abnormal occurrences. Journal of Political Economy 97: 115–154. 
Feinstein, J. S. 1990. Detection controlled estimation. Journal of Law and Economics 33(1): 
233–276. 
Fenwick, G. D., and D. J. Neal. 2001. Effect of gender composition on group performance. 
Gender, Work & Organization 8(2): 205–224. 
Freidson, E. 1994. Professionalism Reborn: Theory, Prophecy, and Policy. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Galland, A. 2010. Toward a Safe, Just Workplace: Apparel Supply Chain Compliance Programs. 
San Francisco: As You Sow. 
Glover, S. M. 1997. The influence of time pressure and accountability on auditors’ processing of 
nondiagnostic information. Journal of Accounting Research 35(2): 213–226. 
Gold, A., J. E. Hunton, and M. I. Gomaa. 2009. The impact of client and auditor gender on 
auditors’ judgments. Accounting Horizons 23(1): 1–18. 
Goldberg, V. P. 1988. Accountable accountants: Is third party liability necessary? Journal of 
Legal Studies 17(2): 295–312. 
Gordon, R. W., and W. H. Simon. 1992. The redemption of professionalism? In R. L. Nelson, D. 
M. Trubek, and R. L. Solomon (eds.), Lawyers’ Ideals, Lawyers’ Practices: Transformations 
in the American Legal Profession: 230–257. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Green, A. W., and E. Melnick.1950. What has happened to the feminist movement? In A. W. 
Gouldner (ed.), Studies in Leadership: 277–302. New York: Harper and Brothers. 
Greenhouse, S. 2013. $40 million in aid set for Bangladesh garment workers. New York Times, 
December 24: B1.  
Guler, I., M. F. Guillén, and J. M. MacPherson. 2002. Global competition, institutions, and the 
diffusion of organizational practices: The international spread of ISO 9000 quality 
certificates. Administrative Science Quarterly 47: 207–232. 
Hainmueller, J., M. J. Hiscox, and S. Sequeira. 2011. Consumer demand for the Fair Trade label: 
Evidence from a field experiment. Research Paper No. 2011–9B, MIT Political Science   32
Department, Cambridge, MA.  
Hawkins, K. 1984. Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of 
Pollution. London: Oxford University Press. 
Haynes, K. 2012. Body beautiful? Gender, identity and the body in professional services firms. 
Gender, Work & Organization 19(5): 489–507. 
Henderson, R. M., and K. B. Clark. 1990. Architectural innovation: The reconfiguration of 
existing product technologies and the failure of established firms. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 35(1): 9–30. 
Heras-Saizarbitoria, I., and O. Boiral. 2013. Research agenda on management system standards. 
International Journal of Management Reviews 15: 47–65. 
Hill, C. A. 2004. Regulating the rating agencies. Washington University Law Quarterly 82(1): 
43–94. 
Hoffman, A. J. 2001. From Heresy to Dogma: An Institutional History of Corporate 
Environmentalism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Hoffman, V. B., and J. M. Patton. 1997. Accountability, the dilution effect, and conservatism in 
auditors’ fraud judgments. Journal of Accounting Research 35(2): 227–237. 
Huber, G. R., and D. J. Power. 1985. Retrospective reports of strategic-level managers: 
Guidelines for increasing their accuracy. Strategic Management Journal 6: 171–180.  
Jacob, B. A. 2002. Where the boys aren’t: Non-cognitive skills, returns to school, and the gender 
gap in higher education. Economics and Education Review 21: 589–598. 
Jenkins, M., G. Esquivel, and F. Larrían. 2001. Export processing zones in Central America. In 
Felipe Larraín (ed.), Economic Development in Central America, vol. I: Growth and 
Internationalization: 197–150. Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University. 
Jones, B. D. 2001. Politics and the Architecture of Choice: Bounded Rationality and 
Governance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Jonnergård, K., A. Stafsudd, and U. Elg. 2010. Performance evaluations as gender barriers in 
professional organizations: A study of auditing firms. Gender, Work & Organization 17(6): 721–
747. 
Joshi, A., and H. Roh. 2009. The role of context in work team diversity research: A meta-
analytic review. Academy of Management Journal 52(3): 599–627. 
Kamatali, J.-M. 2012. The new guiding principles on human rights’ contribution in ending the 
devising debate over human rights responsibilities of companies: Is it time for an ICJ advisory 
opinion? Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 20(2): 437–463. 
Kanter, R. M. 1977. Men and Women of the Corporation. New York: Basic Books. 
Keiser, L. R., and J. Soss. 1998. With good cause: Bureaucratic discretion and the politics of 
child support enforcement. American Journal of Political Science 42(4): 1133–1156. 
Killgore, W. D. S., and D. W. Cupp. 2002. Mood and sex of participant in perception of happy 
faces. Perceptual and Motor Skills 95: 279–288. 
King, A., and M. Lenox. 2001. Lean and green? An empirical examination of the relationship 
between lean production and environmental performance. Production and Operations 
Management 10(3): 244–257. 
King, A. A., and M. W. Toffel. 2009. Self-regulatory institutions for solving environmental 
problems: Perspectives and contributions from the management literature. In M. Delmas and 
O. Young (eds.), Governance for the Environment: New Perspectives: 98–115. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
King, A., M. Lenox, and A. Terlaak. 2005. The strategic use of decentralized institutions:   33
Exploring certification with the ISO 14001 management standard. Academy of Management 
Journal 48(6): 1091–1106. 
Kocer, G. R., and L. Fransen. 2009. Codes of conduct and the promise of a change of climate in 
worker organization. European Journal of Industrial Relations 15(3): 237–256. 
Kumar, J. A., and A. Chakrabarti. 2012. Bounded awareness and tacit knowledge: Revisiting 
Challenger disaster. Journal of Knowledge Management 16(6): 934–949. 
Kuncoro, M. 2011. Recent Development of the Indonesian Apparel Industry. Yogyakarta, 
Indonesia: Gadjah Mada University. 
Larson, M. S. 1977. The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
Lemley, M. A., and B. Sampat. 2012. Examiner characteristics and patent office outcomes. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 94(3): 817–827. 
Levine, D. I., and M. W. Toffel. 2010. Quality management and job quality: How the ISO 9001 
standard for quality management systems affects employees and employers. Management 
Science 56(6): 978–996.  
Lipsky, M. 1980/2010. Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Locke, R. M., and M. Romis. 2007. Improving work conditions in a global supply chain. MIT 
Sloan Management Review 48(2): 54–62. 
Locke, R. M., F. Qin, and A. Brause. 2007. Does monitoring improve labor standards? Lessons 
from Nike. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 61(1): 3–31. 
Locke, R. M., B. A. Rising, and T. Pal. 2012. Complements or substitutes? Private codes, state 
regulation and the improvement of labor standards in global supply chains. Research paper 
no. 2012–2, MIT Political Science Department, Cambridge, MA. 
Lount, R. B., Jr., and K. W. Phillips. 2007. Working harder with the out-group: The impact of 
social category diversity on motivation gains. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes 103: 214–224. 
Loyd, D. L., C. S. Wang, K. W. Phillips, and R. B. Lount, Jr. 2013. Social category diversity 
promotes premeeting elaboration: The role of relationship focus. Organization Science 24(3): 
757–772.  
Macher, J. T., J. W. Mayo, and J. A. Nickerson. 2011. Regulator heterogeneity and endogenous 
efforts to close the information asymmetry gap. Journal of Law and Economics 54(1): 25–54. 
Manns, J. 2013. Downgrading rating agency reform. George Washington Law Review 81: 749–
812. 
May, P. J., and S. Winter. 2000. Reconsidering styles of regulatory enforcement: Patterns in 
Danish agro-environmental inspection. Law and Policy 22(2): 143–173. 
Maynard-Moody, S., and M. Musheno. 2003. Cops, Teachers, Counselors: Narratives of Street-
Level Judgment. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.  
McBarnet, D. 2007. Corporate social responsibility beyond law, through law, for law: The new 
corporate accountability. In D. McBarnet, A. Voiculescu, and T. Campbell (eds.), The New 
Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law: 9–56. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
McBarnet, D., and M. Kurkchiyan. 2007. Corporate social responsibility through contractual 
control? Global supply chains and “other-regulation.” In D. McBarnet, A. Voiculescu, and T. 
Campbell (eds.), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and 
the Law: 59–92. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.   34
Meidinger, E. 2002. The new environmental law: Forest certification. Buffalo Environmental 
Law Journal 10: 213–303. 
Muehlenbachs, L., S. Staubli, and M. A. Cohen. 2013. The effect of inspector group size and 
familiarity on enforcement and deterrence. Discussion paper 13–36, Resources or the Future, 
Washington, DC. 
Montiel, I., B. W. Husted, and P. Christmann. 2012. Using private management standard 
certification to reduce information asymmetries in corrupt environments. Strategic 
Management Journal 33: 1103–1113.  
Moore, D. A., P. E. Tetlock, L. Tanlu, and M. H. Bazerman. 2006. Conflicts of interest and the 
case of auditor independence: Moral seduction and strategic issue cycling. Academy of 
Management Review 31(1): 10–29. 
Mueller, F., C. Carter, and A. Ross-Smith. 2011. Making sense of career in a Big Four accounting 
firm. Current Sociology 59(4): 551–567. 
Oberfield, Z. W. 2010. Rule following and discretion at government’s frontlines: Continuity and 
change during organization socialization. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 20(4): 735–755. 
Oh, P. B. 2004. Gatekeeping. Journal of Corporation Law 29(4): 735–800. 
O’Rourke, D. 2002. Monitoring the monitors: A critique of PricewaterhouseCooper's labor 
monitoring. In R. Jenkins, R. Pearson, and G. Seyfang (eds.), Corporate Responsibility and 
Ethical Trade: Codes of Conduct in the Global Economy: 196–207. London: Earthscan. 
O’Rourke, D. 2003. Outsourcing regulation: Analyzing nongovernmental systems of labor 
standards and monitoring. Policy Studies Journal 31(1): 1–29. 
Parker, C. 1999. Compliance professionalism and regulatory community: The Australian trade 
practices regime. Journal of Law and Society 26(2): 215–239. 
Parmigiani, A. 2007. Why do firms both make and buy? An investigation of concurrent sourcing. 
Strategic Management Journal 28: 285–311. 
Partnoy, F. 2004. Strict liability for gatekeepers: A reply to Professor Coffee. Boston University 
Law Review 84: 365–375. 
Partnoy, F. 2006. How and why credit rating agencies are not like other gatekeepers. In Y. 
Fuchita and R. E. Litan (eds.), Financial Gatekeepers: Can They Protect Investors?: 59–99. 
Baltimore, MD: Brookings Institution Press.  
Phillips, K. W., M. Duguid, M. Thomas-Hunt, and J. Uparna. 2012. Diversity as knowledge 
exchange: The roles of information processing, expertise, and status. In Q. M. Roberson 
(ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Diversity and Work: 157–178. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Pierce, L., and M. W. Toffel. 2013. The role of organizational scope and governance in 
strengthening private monitoring. Organization Science 24(5): 1558–1584.  
Piore, M. J. 2005. Rethinking international labor standards. In W. Milberg (ed.), Labor and the 
Globalization of Production: Causes and Consequences: 249–265. New York: Macmillan.  
Piore, M. J., and A. Schrank. 2008. Toward managed flexibility: The revival of labour inspection 
in the Latin world. International Labour Review 147(1): 1–23. 
Portillo, S. 2012. The paradox of rules: Rules as resources and constraints. Administration and 
Society 44(1): 87–108. 
Portillo, S., and L. DeHart-Davis. 2009. Gender and organizational rule abidance. Public 
Administration Review 69: 339–347. 
Potoski, M., and A. Prakash. 2004. Regulatory convergence in nongovernmental regimes: Cross-
national adoption of ISO 14001 certification. Journal of Politics 66: 885–905.   35
Potoski, M., and A. Prakash. 2005a. Covenants with weak swords: ISO 14001 and facilities’ 
environmental performance. Journal of Policy Analysis Management 24: 745–769. 
Potoski, M., and A. Prakash. 2005b. Green clubs and voluntary governance: ISO 14001 and 
firms’ regulatory compliance. American Journal of Political Science 49(2): 235–248. 
Power, D., and M. Terziovski. 2007. Quality audit roles and skills: Perceptions of non-financial 
auditors and their clients. Journal of Operations Management 25(1): 126–147. 
Power, M. 1997. The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press. 
Prakash, A., and M. Potoski. 2006. Racing to the bottom? Trade, environmental governance, and 
ISO 14001. American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 350–364. 
Reitzig M., and S. Wagner. 2010. The hidden costs of outsourcing: Evidence from patent data. 
Strategic Management Journal 31: 1183–1201.  
Rodríguez-Garavito, C. 2005. Global governance and labor rights: Codes of conduct and anti-
sweatshop struggles in global apparel factories in Mexico and Guatemala. Politics and 
Society 33(2): 203–233. 
Ruggie, J. 2008. Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights. 
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises. United Nations, Human 
Rights Council, Geneva, Switzerland. http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-
Apr-2008.pdf.  
Sandfort, J. R. 2000. Moving beyond discretion and outcomes: Examining public management 
from the front lines of the welfare system. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 10(4): 729–756.  
Schrank, A. 2009. Professionalization and probity in a patrimonial state: Labor inspectors in the 
Dominican Republic. Latin American Politics and Society 51(2): 91–115. 
Schwarcz, S. L. 2002. Private ordering of public markets: The rating agency paradox. University 
of Illinois Law Review 2002(1): 1–27. 
Scott, C. 2012. Non-judicial enforcement of transnational private regulation. In F. Cafaggi (ed.), 
Enforcement of Transnational Regulation: Ensuring Compliance in a Global World: 147–
164. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Scott, R. W. 1966. Professionals in bureaucracies—areas of conflict. In H. M. Vollmer and D. L. 
Mills (eds.), Professionalization: 265–275. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Shamir, R. 2005. Corporate social responsibility: A case of hegemony and counter-hegemony. In 
B. de Sousa Santos and C. A. Rodríguez-Garavito (eds.), Law and Globalization from Below: 
92–117. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Short, J. L., and M. W. Toffel. 2010. Making self-regulation more than merely symbolic: The 
critical role of the legal environment. Administrative Science Quarterly 55(3): 361–396. 
Simon, H. A. 1947. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in 
Administrative Organizations. New York: Free Press. 
Spence, J. T., and C. E. Buckner. 2000. Instrumental and expressive traits, trait stereotypes, and 
sexist attitudes: What do they signify? Psychology of Women Quarterly 24: 44–62. 
Stonewater, B. B., S. A. Eveslage, and M. R. Dingerson. 1990. Gender differences in career 
helping relationships. Career Development Quarterly 39: 72–85. 
Surroca, J., J. A. Tribo, and S. Waddock. 2010. Corporate responsibility and financial 
performance: The role of intangible resources. Strategic Management Journal 31: 463–490.  
Teitelbaum, J. C. 2006. Age and tenure of the justices and productivity of the Supreme Court:   36
Are term limits necessary? Florida State University Law Review 34: 161–182. 
Terlaak, A., and A. A. King. 2006. The effect of certification with the ISO 9000 Quality 
Management Standard: A signaling approach. Journal of Economics Behavior and 
Organization 60(4): 579–602. 
Tetlock, P. E. 1983. Accountability and complexity of thought. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 45(1): 74–83. 
Thayer, J. F., and B. H. Johnsen. 2000. Sex differences in judgment of facial affect: A 
multivariate analysis of recognition errors. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 41(3): 243–
246. 
Thompson, J. D. 1967. Organizations in Action. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Thompson, V. A. 1977. Modern Organization, 2nd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Toffel, M. W., J. L. Short, and M. Ouellet. 2013. Codes in context: How states, markets, and 
civil society shape adherence to global labor standards. Working paper 13–045, Harvard 
Business School, Boston. 
Turner, C. W. 2001. Accountability demands and the auditor’s evidence search strategy: The 
influence of reviewer preferences and the nature of the response (belief vs. action). Journal 
of Accounting Research 39(3): 683–706. 
U.S. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. 2011. Concept Release on Auditor 
Independence and Audit Firm Rotation. Release No. 2011–006 (August 16). 
US SIF. 2012. Report on Sustainable and Responsible Investing Trends in the United States: 
2012. Washington, DC: The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment (US SIF).  
von Krogh, G., J. Roos, and K. Slocum. 1994. An essay on corporate epistemology. Strategic 
Management Journal 15(1): 53–71. 
Waddock, S. A., and S. B. Graves. 1997. The corporate social performance–financial 
performance link. Strategic Management Journal 18(4): 303–319. 
Walsh, D., and S. Greenhouse. 2012. Certified safe, a factory in Karachi still quickly burned. 
New York Times, December 8: A1. 
Weber, B., M. Wittchen, and G. Hertel. 2009. Gendered ways to motivation gains in groups. Sex 
Roles 60: 731–744. 
Weber, M. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: Free Press. 
Williamson, A., J. H. Rogerson, and A. D. Vella. 1996. Quality system auditors’ attitudes and 
methods: A survey. International Journal of Quality Reliability and Management 13(8): 39–
52. 
Wood, S. 2004. The role of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in 
governing environmental conflict and corporate social responsibility in developing countries: 
Questions for research. In B. L. Toro (ed.), Propriedad, Conflicto y Medio Ambiente: 15–56. 
Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad del Rosario. 
World Bank. 2013. Worldwide governance indicators: Frequently asked questions. 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/faq.htm, accessed April 2013. 
Yardley, J. 2012. Recalling fire’s horror and exposing global brands’ safety gap. New York 
Times, December 7: A1.  
Yin, H., and P. J. Schmeidler. 2009. Why do standardized ISO 14001 environmental 
management systems lead to heterogeneous environmental outcomes? Business Strategy and 
the Environment 18: 469–486. 
Zandvliet, R. 2011. Corporate social responsibility reporting in the European Union: Towards a 
more univocal framework. Columbia Journal of European Law (online)18: 38.   37
Table 1. Industry composition 
 
Industry Audits    Factories 
 Number Percent   Number Percent 
Accessories 1,740 10   579 10 
Building materials  260 2   84 1 
Chemicals and plastics  97 1   42 1 
Electronics 590 4   184 3 
Food, agriculture, beverage  138 1   58 1 
Footwear 356 2   122 2 
Furniture 383 2   123 2 
Garments 6,188 37   2,113 36 
Metal products  156 1   51 1 
Paper, printing, publishing  183 1   63 1 
Services 50 0   19 0 
Toys 463 3   150 3 
Other/unknown 6,191 37   2,231 38 
Total 16,795 100    5,819 100 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
 
Variable  Mean SD  Min Max 
Number of violations  6.49 5.61 0  75 
Previous auditor  0.15 0.36 0  1 
Maximum tenure  5.39 2.03 1  15 
Average tenure  4.86 1.85 0.5  15 
Graduate education  0.13 0.34 0  1 
Auditing skills training  2.25 1.74 0  12 
All-male audit team  0.33 0.47 0  1 
All-female audit team  0.50 0.50 0  1 
Mixed-gender audit team  0.17 0.37 0  1 
Certification training  0.50 0.42 0  1 
Brand training  0.59 0.43 0  1 
Average age  30.12 4.47 22.5  59 
Maximum age  30.62 4.66 25  59 
Third-party protocol  0.04 0.19 0  1 
Unannounced audit  0.22 0.41 0  1 
Audit paid for by factory or agent  0.56 0.50 0  1 
Audit paid for by brand  0.44 0.50 0  1 
Re-audit 0.36 0.48 0  1 
Number of auditors  1.79 0.58 1  5 
Audit sequence  2.96 2.25 1  21 
Per-capita GDP (log)  7.77 0.98 5.61  10.68 
Regulatory quality  -0.04 0.54 -1.64  1.99 
Press freedom  0.33 0.27 0.12  1.00 
Note: N =16,795 audits except N =15,812 for audit paid for by factory or agent and audit paid for by 
brand, N =11,337 for average age and maximum age, and N =16,676 for press freedom.  38
Table 3. Pairwise correlations 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11)  (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
(1)  Number  of  violations  1.00                         
(2)  Previous  auditor  -0.13  1.00                      
(3)  Maximum  tenure  -0.01  0.03 1.00                     
(4)  Average  tenure  -0.03  0.03 0.92 1.00                    
(5)  Graduate  education  -0.07  0.09 -0.04 -0.04 1.00                   
(6)  Auditing  skills  training  -0.03  0.05 -0.20 -0.30 -0.04 1.00                  
(7)  All-male  audit  team  -0.07  0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.07 1.00                 
(8)  All-female  audit  team  0.05  -0.09 0.03 0.07 -0.14 0.01 -0.70 1.00                
(9)  Mixed-gender  audit  team  0.02  0.04 0.03 -0.09 0.09 0.07 -0.32 -0.45 1.00               
(10)  Certification  training  0.01  0.04 0.09 0.12 -0.04 0.47 0.04 0.03 -0.09 1.00              
(11)  Brand  training  -0.02  0.06 -0.15 -0.16 -0.09 0.59 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.45 1.00               
(12)  Average  age  -0.10  0.16 0.43 0.49 0.18 -0.17 0.22 -0.22 0.02 0.08 -0.12  1.00            
(13)  Maximum  age  -0.08  0.16 0.43 0.45 0.19 -0.12 0.19 -0.23 0.07 0.07 -0.12  0.97 1.00           
(14)  Third-party  protocol  0.12  0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01  0.00 0.00 1.00          
(15)  Unannounced  audit  0.00  0.05 0.11 0.11 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04  0.06 0.05 -0.09 1.00         
(16) Audit paid for by factory or agent  0.02  -0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.04  -0.03 -0.02 -0.14 -0.20 1.00           
(17) Audit paid for by brand  -0.02  0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.07 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.04  0.03 0.02 0.14 0.20 -1.00 1.00         
(18) Re-audit  -0.12  0.12 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01  -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 0.07 0.05 -0.05 1.00     
(19) Number of auditors  0.13  -0.05 -0.06 -0.27 0.01 0.04 -0.23 -0.05 0.36 -0.27 -0.18  -0.29 -0.21 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.05 1.00   
(20) Audit sequence  -0.28  0.15 -0.14 -0.20 -0.03 0.31 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.09 0.20 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.12 0.02 1.00   
(21) Per-capita GDP (log)  -0.18  0.08 0.22 0.20 -0.05 0.21 -0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.09 0.14  -0.06 -0.08 -0.07 0.12 -0.16 0.16 -0.09 -0.13 0.14 1.00 
(22) Regulatory quality  -0.19  0.10 0.22 0.21 0.01 0.14 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.09  0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.13 -0.18 0.18 -0.11 -0.15 0.11 0.95 1.00 
(23) Press freedom  -0.27  0.22 0.22 0.25 0.34 -0.05 0.15 -0.14 0.00 -0.02 -0.02  0.46 0.42 0.00 0.12 -0.24 0.24 -0.14 -0.28 0.02 0.54 0.65 
   39
Table 4. Regression results 
 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    Coef.  
Average 
marginal 
effects 
Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.  
H1 Previous  auditor  -0.043*  -0.28 -0.039+ -0.028  -0.044*  -0.027 
  [0.020]  [0.020] [0.026] [0.021] [0.025] 
H2 Maximum  tenure  0.065** 0.12  0.068** 0.078**  0.069** 0.084**
  [0.014]  [0.014] [0.016] [0.014] [0.017] 
H2  Maximum tenure, squared  -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.005** -0.005**
  [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
H3  Graduate  education  0.027 0.18  0.030  -0.004 0.021 0.045 
  [0.024]  [0.024] [0.029] [0.026] [0.039] 
H3  Auditing skills training  0.021** 0.14  0.022** 0.013  0.022** 0.012 
  [0.007]  [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.009] 
H4  All-female audit team  0.054** 0.35  0.055** 0.048*  0.053** 0.052* 
  [0.015]  [0.015] [0.019] [0.016] [0.021] 
H5 Mixed-gender  audit  team  0.067** 0.43  0.068** 0.049*  0.069** 0.067* 
  [0.021]  [0.021] [0.024] [0.021] [0.028] 
 Certification  training  -0.021 -0.14  -0.024 -0.027 -0.031 -0.010 
  [0.021]  [0.021] [0.027] [0.021] [0.029] 
 Brand  training  -0.014 -0.09  -0.012  0.008 -0.007  0.001 
  [0.021]  [0.022] [0.026] [0.022] [0.030] 
 Average  age  -0.025 -0.04  -0.026 -0.015 -0.023 -0.041 
  [0.019]  [0.020] [0.028] [0.019] [0.027] 
  Average  age,  squared  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 Third-party  protocol  -0.080 -0.52  -0.088 -0.148*  -0.210* 
  [0.058] [0.062]  [0.070] [0.101] 
  Unannounced  audit  0.029 0.19  0.029 0.030 0.031 0.075**
  [0.020]  [0.020] [0.025] [0.020] [0.027] 
  Audit paid for by factory or agent  -0.084** -0.55 -0.083** -0.068*  -0.064*  -0.099**
  [0.026]  [0.027] [0.032] [0.028] [0.034] 
 Re-audit  -0.348** -2.26  -0.351** -0.353** -0.358** -0.345**
  [0.016]  [0.016] [0.019] [0.017] [0.020] 
  Per-capita GDP (log)  -0.623*  -4.04 -0.551*  -0.749  -0.714** -0.210 
  [0.262]  [0.264] [0.473] [0.267] [0.389] 
 Regulatory  quality  -0.180 -1.17  -0.169 -0.385 -0.158 -0.621**
  [0.150]  [0.150] [0.298] [0.153] [0.231] 
 Press  freedom    -0.510*  -3.31  -0.531* -1.059* -0.402+ -0.879**
  [0.224]  [0.224] [0.476] [0.239] [0.339] 
 Observations  (audits)  16,795  16,585 10,648 16,044  9,266 
  Factories  5,819  5,748 3,810 5,523 3,082 
Standard errors clustered by audited factory; ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10. All models also include fixed 
effects for the audited establishment, audit year, client country, number of auditors (2 through 5 or more), and the 
factory’s audit sequence (2nd through 6th or more). All models include three dummy variables to indicate instances 
in which the following variables were missing data and thus recoded to 0: average age and maximum age (5,458 
audits), audit paid for by factory or agent and audit paid for by brand (983 audits), and press freedom (119 audits). 
Model 1 is the primary model estimated on the entire sample. Model 2 excludes audits conducted for clients whose 
audit teams were always all-female. Model 3 includes only audits conducted by at least two auditors. Model 4 
excludes audits conducted according to a third-party protocol. Model 5 excludes factories’ first inspection during the 
sample period.   40
Figure 1.  Effect of the audit team’s maximum tenure on average predicted violations per 
factory  
Average 
predicted 
number of 
violations 
  Audit team’s maximum tenure 
 
Note: The figure depicts average predicted number of violations from the fixed-effects Poisson 
model estimated in Column 1 of Table 4, spanning the 5th to 95th
 percentiles of audit tenure. 
Dashed lines represent the 95-percent confidence interval. 
 
 
Figure 2. The average number of violations per audit declines in factories’ successive audits 
Average 
number of 
violations 
  Factory’s audit sequence 
 
Note: The figure depicts sample averages, with dashed lines representing 95-percent confidence 
intervals calculated as the sample mean ± two times the standard error of the mean. 
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